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Selling Antitrust
HERBERT HOVENKAMP†
Antitrust enforcers and its other defenders have never done a good job of selling their field to
the public. That is not entirely their fault. Antitrust is inherently technical, and a less engaging
discipline to most people than, say, civil rights or criminal law. The more serious problem is
that when the general press does talk about antitrust policy, it naturally gravitates toward the
fringes, both the far right and the far left. Extreme rhetoric makes for better press than the dayto-day operations of a technical enterprise. The extremes are often stated in overdramatized
black-and-white terms that avoid the real world subtleties that make science more fact
dependent but also more useful.
Both extreme positions generally favor lower output as a solution to antitrust problems. The
result is higher prices and fewer jobs. The right shrugs at higher prices because of its faith that
there are offsetting efficiencies in production. The left simply accepts that higher prices benefit
smaller competitors, its preferred protected class. On employment, the extreme right does not
really care, because suppressing labor power was part of a bigger neoliberal agenda. The
negative impact on jobs remains a major blind spot for the left, however, which claims to support
worker rights but ends up advocating policies that do much more harm than good.
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INTRODUCTION
Antitrust’s promoters have never done a particularly good job selling their
field to the public. That is not entirely their fault. Antitrust is inherently
technical, and a less engaging discipline to most people than, say, civil rights or
criminal law. The more serious problem is that when the general press talks
about antitrust policy, it naturally gravitates toward the fringes, both the far right
and today, increasingly, the far left. Extreme rhetoric makes for better press than
the day-to-day operations of a technical enterprise. The extremes are often stated
in overdramatized, black-and-white terms that avoid the worldly subtleties that
make the economics of antitrust law not only more complex and fact dependent,
but also more useful. Richard Hofstadter captured the issue well in his iconic
1965 essay, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement? 1 He noted that, for
decades, antitrust was filled with rhetorical fervor aimed mainly at a poorly
defined group of firms called “trusts.” During that period, however, antitrust law
accomplished very little. When antitrust law finally peeled the rhetoric away and
developed a coherent set of enforcement rules, the public lost interest.
Nevertheless, in the process, antitrust was actually able to get something done.
A good illustration of this is the use of “winner-take-all” rhetoric to
describe the big digital platforms. The press loves the suggestion that these firms
naturally gravitate toward permanent monopoly status. In fact, nothing could be
further from the truth, as suggested by Facebook’s recent stock market crash.2
The crash was induced in substantial part by the entry and rapid growth of
TikTok, which has been rapidly peeling users away from Facebook. Explaining
“differentiated” entry to the press has proven difficult, however—although it
need not be. The theory of natural monopoly, from which the term “winner-takeall” was derived, was limited to undifferentiated firms such as utilities who faced
identical demand but had declining costs. Neither Facebook nor any similarly
situated platform is likely to face new entry from a clone. Rather, it will (and
did) come from a rival who produces a different but overlapping product.
Centrist antitrust is flanked by two outspoken extremes. Both groups live
primarily in the past, although in different parts of it. Antitrust’s neoliberal right
grew out of a reaction to the New Deal that developed in the 1940s through the
1970s, prior to the rise of robust and testable models of imperfect competition.3
The principal targets were the theories of oligopoly and monopolistic

1. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1st ed. 1965). The essay is reprinted in THE MAKING OF COMPETITION
POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 2013). Hofstadter’s
essay originally appeared in THE BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT 113 (Earl F. Cheit ed., 1964).
2. E.g., Christiaan Hetzner, As Rivals Close in on Facebook, Zuckerberg Pins Hopes on Meta’s New
TikTok Rival, FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2022, 10:51 AM), https://fortune.com/2022/02/03/facebook-earnings-market
cap-stock-market-zuckerberg-tiktok-metaverse/.
3. E.g., George J. Stigler, Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect, in FIVE LECTURES ON ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS 12, 12–23 (1949); Milton R. Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 39 (1953).
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competition that at the time were considered novel but untestable.4 Today, that
is no longer the case. Not only are they robust and testable, but they have largely
displaced older perfect competition models that the Chicago School defended so
aggressively from the 1940s through the 1970s.5
Antitrust’s extreme left depends on ideas developed decades earlier, with
exaggerated but simple views about the harms caused by big firms, yet largely
disregarding the welfare of consumers and labor—two enormous beneficiaries
of competitive markets.6 This position, sometimes referred to as “Progressive”
or “Neo-Brandeisian,” attempts to get back to an imagined view of Progressive
antitrust policy. It does not accurately represent the views of the actual
Progressives.7 Even if it did, there is no obvious need to return to it, any more
than a need to return to, say, the gold standard or mandatory balanced budgets.
The use of the term “Progressive” to describe the policies of the new
antitrust left is historically unfortunate. In fact, no era has contributed more to
modern antitrust doctrine than the original Progressive era, and the vast majority
of its contributions were pro-enforcement. Among its contributions was partial
equilibrium analysis, which breaks the economy up into small segments, or
“markets,” for purposes of study. This microeconomic doctrine led to the
development of the “relevant market” in antitrust law for estimating power.
Another Progressive development was the use of tools for measuring industrial
concentration as a device for assessing industry competitiveness. Yet another
was the concept of entry barriers, in contrast to the classical presumption that
new entry is both easy and certain to discipline monopoly pricing. Additionally,
there was the development of a more technical theory of costs, including the idea
that industries with high fixed costs are more problematic and more conducive
to unstable competition and cartels, and thus warrant closer scrutiny.8 The new
Progressives have purloined the name while ignoring most of the valuable
antitrust enforcement tools that the actual Progressives developed.
How should antitrust be marketed to a press and readership whose principal
common characteristic is a short attention span? The remainder of this Essay
highlights four positions that are harmful as a matter of antitrust law. They are
attractive to the public, however, because each of them can be declared on a
post-it note. The corrections unfortunately require both facts and explanation.

4. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Error Costs, U. PENN. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at 9), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2742/ [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust Error
Costs].
5. Id.
6. On the Neo-Brandeis movement, see generally David Dayen, This Budding Movement Wants to Smash
Monopolies, THE NATION (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/this-budding movementwants-to-smash-monopolies/. For incisive commentary, see generally Daniel A. Crane, How Much Brandeis Do
the Neo-Brandeisians Want?, 64 ANTITRUST BULL. 531 (2019).
7. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Invention of Antitrust 2 (U. Penn. Inst. for L. & Econ. Rsrch Paper,
Working Paper No. 22-05), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3995502.
8. Id. at 9.
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I. SELLING ANTITRUST: DEBUNKING THE BIG FOUR
A. THE CONSUMER WELFARE PRINCIPLE
The first is the misuse of antitrust’s “consumer welfare” principle, which
has produced a great deal of resistance from people who do not understand its
meaning. The misunderstanding is largely the fault of Robert Bork, who
borrowed a general welfare concept from economics and then renamed it
“consumer” welfare. Rhetorically, that was a tour de force and contributed a
great deal to its popularity. It also contributed to lower output and higher prices
as a result of practices that should have been condemned but were not. “Output”
is measured by quantity, quality, or innovation, all three of which contribute to
consumer value. Facilitating higher output both reduces prices and improves
product quality, as sellers need to reach more buyers.
The fundamental problem with Bork’s vision of consumer welfare was that
he included producer profits as part of the welfare of consumers. For example,
if a practice produced $500 in consumer losses but $600 in producer gains, Bork
could label it as promoting “consumer welfare” even though the consumers were
actually losers. The impact of this mislabeling has shown up prominently in
Supreme Court opinions. For example, the dissenters in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.
could proclaim that the goal of antitrust law is to improve consumer welfare
even as they would have approved of a practice—pay-for-delay pharmaceutical
patent settlements—that led to higher drug prices and harmed actual consumers.9
The same is true of the majority opinion in Ohio v. Amex Express Co., which
declared support for the consumer welfare principle even while approving a
practice that imposed high consumer prices on every affected transaction.10
Bork’s definition of “consumer welfare” as including producer profits was
his way of addressing practices that could be efficient even as they created a
monopoly. Mergers are a commonly given example, but there are others. Bork
borrowed a very well-known figure from economist Oliver Williamson as his
model. A challenged practice might create a monopoly, producing deadweight
loss, designated at A1 in the figure below, but also reducing costs, as shown in
area A2. Bork’s consumer welfare principle stated that this practice should be
approved if the cost savings area was larger than the deadweight loss area. Bork
used the figure below and described its meaning in The Antitrust Paradox.11

9. 570 U.S. 136, 161 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
10. 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2289–90 (2018).
11. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 107 (1978).
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FIGURE 1: THE CONSUMER WELFARE PRINCIPLE

The one thing Bork did not describe in any detail was the relationship
between O1 and O2 at the bottom of this figure. The bottom line represents
output, and O2 in the figure is about half the distance between the zero point and
O1. In other words, this particular practice reduced output by roughly half, even
as it was generating enormous efficiencies. The actual output reduction could be
greater or less than half, depending on the shape of the demand curve and the
extent of the cost savings.
One thing that Bork did say about output was that “any efficiencies
associated with a firm’s size are very likely to outweigh any restriction of output
on the consumer welfare scale.”12 The statement is mystifying, but one thing it
reveals is how little Bork knew about business. He appeared to think that the
efficiencies that resulted from larger firm size came from the number of square
feet in a plant or the number of facilities a firm owns, or some other marker that
he associated with a “firm’s size.” But large size produces efficiencies mainly
by increasing output.
This is a case of what Ronald Coase famously called “blackboard
economics,” where the geometry makes sense when you draw it with a piece of
chalk, but has little or no correspondence to the real world. 13 Bork never
addressed the eminently important policy question of exactly what type of
situation produces these results. The most important economy that firms achieve
through mergers or joint ventures is economies of scale, but these generally
accrue at greater rather than lesser output. Further, per unit fixed costs vary
inversely with output. For example, a firm that has fixed costs of one-thousand
dollars and produces two-hundred units has per unit fixed costs of five dollars.
12. Id. at 179.
13. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 19, 28 (1988).
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Yet if that firm reduces its output to one-hundred units while its fixed costs
remain unchanged, its per unit fixed costs rise to ten dollars. So, the monopolies
that Bork must have had in mind were not firms with substantial fixed costs. But
in that case, what was the source of durable monopoly?
Finally, but too often forgotten, is the impact of output on labor. Labor is
largely a variable cost, and at the lower end of the pay scale, it is almost entirely
a variable cost. 14 As a result, price-increasing and output-reducing practices
harm not only consumers, but also hurt labor—perhaps significantly. This
remains one of the biggest blind spots in the Neo-Brandeisian movement: it
legitimately states a strong concern for practices such as noncompete clauses
that limit labor mobility, but ignores the far bigger labor issue that affects many
more workers, which is what happens to jobs when excessive protectionism for
small business results in lower product output and decreases the need for labor.15
The press typically does not have the patience for all of these fine points.
To the extent they relate “consumer welfare” to “Bork,” they acquire the
impression that consumer welfare is some kind of right-wing conspiracy to harm
people in order to preserve high profits for firms. Properly defined, however,
consumer welfare favors maximum sustainable output, which is consistent with
competitive markets and benefits both consumers and suppliers, including
workers. It manifestly does not favor high profits. The concept of maximum
sustainable output is not a license to produce cheap goods. To the contrary,
satisfying those needs is a form of output to the extent firms prefer better or more
innovative products.
Higher output solutions can harm competitors, however, and for that reason
various small business interests have opposed them. It is typically bad for rivals
when a firm increases its production, improves the quality of its product, or
invests in innovation. Small business interests raised these concerns during the
formative years of antitrust enforcement: during the New Deal, during the 1960s,
and finally, now. Brandeis’s name is so often mentioned today because he was
a champion of small business, 16 including of legal rules that imposed higher
costs on larger firms for the benefit of smaller ones. For example, one of his
well-known dissents expressed support for state laws passed at the behest of
small business that taxed chain stores at progressively increasing rates as the
number of stores increased.17 In fact, he conceded that a possible effect of the
statute was to make it unprofitable for the chains to do business in the state.18 He
was also a lifelong supporter of resale price maintenance (“RPM”), or
manufacturer limitations on retailer price cutting. For Brandeis, RPM induced
14. Further developed in Herbert Hovenkamp, Worker Welfare and Antitrust 12 (Apr. 22, 2022)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4015834.
15. Id. at 21.
16. See, e.g., Barak Orbach, Antitrust Populism, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 9 (2017).
17. E.g., Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 542–45 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 541 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The statute seeks to do this by subjecting the latter to financial
handicaps which may conceivably compel their withdrawal from the state.”).
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by retailer groups was a way of preventing larger firms from selling at lower
prices.19 The same concerns were reflected in the 1960s when the government
condemned the Brown Shoe merger because it resulted in either “lower prices
or in higher quality for the same price,” harming smaller business competitors
who could not compete.20 Consumer welfare as maximum sustainable output is
consistent with, although it does not compel, the existence of large firms.
B. ERROR COST ANALYSIS
A second position that has more rhetorical appeal than factual support is
that the best thing that antitrust can do in areas of uncertainty is nothing. As a
result, antitrust policy should be invoked only against very egregious practices
such as naked price-fixing. The fundamentals of this view were developed in the
1940s and 1950s by prominent Chicago School scholars such as George J.
Stigler and Milton Friedman. The view migrated into the legal literature after it
had largely become obsolete in economics, but it has proven to be very resilient,
mainly because it brings profits to so many firms.21
This idea, which goes by the name “error cost” analysis, begins with the
premise that markets are robust and will naturally work themselves toward
acceptable levels of competition. Judicial errors, by contrast, take a much longer
time to correct. As a result, overdeterrence in antitrust is a much bigger problem
than underdeterrence.22 Justice Gorsuch reflected this view during oral argument
in the Amex case when he suggested that “judicial errors are a lot harder to
correct than an occasional monopoly.”23 When we are in doubt, the best thing to
do is nothing. Today, the right’s adherence to error cost analysis in spite of a
forty-year-long explosion of economic evidence that undermines it, is one of the
most important sources of capture in the private economy. Both of its premises
are wrong. Far from working inevitably toward competition, the amount of
monopoly in the economy has been increasing steadily since the 1980s. Further,
judges are quite capable of overruling or limiting bad antitrust decisions, often
in a timely fashion.24
19. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95 IOWA
L. REV. 863, 905–06 (2010). On Brandeis’s activism, see LAURA PHILLIPS SAWYER, AMERICAN FAIR TRADE:
PROPRIETARY CAPITALISM, CORPORATISM, AND THE “NEW COMPETITION,” 1890-1940, at 107–09 (2019).
20. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff’d, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)
(“Company-owned and company-controlled retail stores have definite advantages in buying and credit; they
have further advantages in advertising, insurance, inventory control and assists and price control. These
advantages result in lower prices or in higher quality for the same price and the independent retailer can no
longer compete . . . .”).
21. See Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,
168 PENN. L. REV. 1843, 1850 (2020).
22. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1984).
23. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No. 161454) (“[W]hy shouldn’t we take Judge Easterbrook’s admonition seriously, that judicial errors are a lot harder
to correct than an occasional monopoly where you can hope and assume that the market will eventually correct
it? Judicial errors are very difficult to correct.”).
24. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Error Costs, supra note 4, at 7.
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C. BREAKING UP THE LARGE DIGITAL PLATFORM
A third error is thinking that the large digital platforms are inherently bad
and that the only good way to fix the problem is to break them up. Enthusiasm
for breakups has waxed and waned across the history of antitrust enforcement.
Courts are not very good at restructuring firms. The risks that an imposed
breakup will do more harm than good are significant. Bad breakups can cause
considerable harm to consumers, labor, and other affected interests, often
without solving the monopoly problem at hand.
However, not all “breakups” are alike. It is important to distinguish
divestitures of acquired assets—that is, the undoing of mergers—from breaking
off assets that were internally developed.25 Indeed, the unwinding of unlawful
mergers has always been a well-established part of antitrust enforcement policy
and remains so. The reason that we do much less of it today is a consequence of
legislation passed in 197626 requiring most high-value mergers to be reported
before they occur. The result is that legal challenges typically precede the actual
acquisition, and no breakup ever occurs. If the government wins, the remedy is
an injunction barring the merger.
The statute does not eliminate the right to challenge consummated mergers,
and a few such cases do occur.27 Post-merger breakups are still an acceptable
remedy for mergers that turn out later to be problematic. Whether a breakup is
the best remedy depends in part on how well integrated the acquired firm’s assets
are into the acquiring firm. For example, the FTC’s pending complaint against
Facebook challenges its acquisitions of Instagram and Whatsapp several years
after the acquisitions occurred despite the fact that they were reviewed and
approved at the time. 28 Both firms retain distinct platforms and customer
subscriptions,29 however, and neither is fully integrated into Facebook’s main
platform. Breaking them off from Facebook should be manageable, although it
may require some sharing of user information.
By contrast, breaking up internally developed assets is more difficult, and
there is a greater chance of error. However, even these can succeed. One case in
point is the telephone system, broken into seven regional firms by an antitrust
consent decree in 1982.30 That breakup was a policy success because it insisted
on interoperability and thus preserved nearly all of the beneficial network effects
25. See e.g., Rory Van Loo, In Defense of Breakups: Administering A “Radical” Remedy, 105 CORNELL
L. REV. 1955, 1959 (2020) (dealing mainly with spinoffs of acquired assets).
26. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(c)–15(h), 16, 18(a).
27. See Menesh S. Patel, Merger Breakups, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 975, 983–84 (2020).
28. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief ¶ 64, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590JEB, 2021 WL 2643627 (D.D.C. June 28, 2021); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform
Monopoly, 130 YALE L.J. 1952, 2033 (2021) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platorm Monopoly].
29. See INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/ (last visited July 31, 2022); WHATSAPP,
https://www.whatsapp.com/ (last visited July 31, 2022).
30. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 141–42, 222 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom., Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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of a unitary phone system. That consent decree should offer a playbook for
antitrust regulators dividing Facebook from a spun-off firm such as Instagram.
An effective breakup must break into a monopoly, however, and not merely
spin it off. For example, some have suggested that Alphabet, the parent of
Google, should spin off Google Search. But if Google search is itself the
monopoly, all that breakup will do is transfer the monopoly to a different owner.
If a firm produces eighty percent of the market’s toasters and fifty percent of the
market’s blenders, spinning off the blender division will simply give us one firm
that continues to control eighty percent of the toasters and a second that controls
fifty percent of the blenders. To break up the monopoly we need to divide toaster
production. In most markets, and particularly digital ones, that is much more
difficult to accomplish.
To be sure, one monopoly division in a firm may be able to cross-subsidize
another division, but then we need to sort out how much of this is beneficial and
how much is harmful. For example, in Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
the Second Circuit refused to condemn Kodak’s simultaneous introduction of a
new camera and film cartridge that were compatible only with one another.31
The mere fact that one department in the firm “benefits from association” with
another division that has monopoly power should not be unlawful.32 In this case,
consumers found the new camera-film package so desirable that it swept the
market. Further, in most cases, there are nonstructural alternatives such as
injunctions that will work better. In Berkey, the plaintiff did not seek divesture
of Kodak’s film business, but only an order compelling Kodak to disclose
technology in progress that might harm a rival.33 For example, Android handheld
manufacturers have made Google Search the default search engine, but that
practice was ended in the European Union by an injunction, not a breakup.34 The
same thing could happen under United States law.
Simply breaking up firms without considering these effects can make a
firm smaller but almost certainly not more attractive. For example, we might
break Facebook into one firm exclusively for men and another exclusively for
women, or perhaps into different firms for different geographic areas. Or we
could divest video posting, or message boards, or some other feature. Removing
features would make Facebook smaller, but it would also be crippling, not only
for Facebook itself but also for its users, shareholders, employees, and suppliers.
Indeed, the very features that make Facebook attractive also explain why it is
large—namely, the ability to connect a very large network of members without
31. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
32. Id. at 276.
33. See id. at 281 (reversing district court’s jury instruction that required a monopolist to pre-disclose
whether its new technology made “it impossible for a competitor to compete with Kodak in the camera market
unless it could offer products similar to Kodak’s.”).
34. See Google to Allow Android Users in Europe Choose Default Search Engine, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2019,
2:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-google-antitrust/google-to-allow-android-users-in-europe choose
-default-search-engine-idUSL4N24Y2GY.
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significant restriction, and to offer an aggregated set of features that these
members can use on demand in differing combinations.
There are more promising alternatives, although we have less experience
with them. One is compelled “interoperability,” which has become a term for a
decree that requires a dominant firm to share some operations or data with other
firms. The grandparent of such remedies is the consent decree that broke up the
telephone company,35 subsequently expanded by the 1996 Telecommunications
Act,36 which permitted smaller phone carriers to interconnect with the dominant
carriers. For more than a decade, interconnection was supervised by a single
federal judge, Harold Greene. 37 Then federal and state telecommunications
agencies took over that task. The result was the creation of the national telephone
network as we have it today, which has largely achieved the gold standard
among networks: everyone can talk to everyone else.
Interoperability remedies could also be made to work in markets for things
like ride-hailing services. For example, Uber and Lyft might be joined under a
common app, and the two firms or their drivers could bid by posting their fares.
The user of the app would select a car based on price, location, or other features.
Making interoperability work in more complex situations like Facebook or
consumer search engines would be more challenging but likely doable.
Interconnection remedies are a particularly promising alternative on two-sided
platforms with substantial direct and indirect network effects. Here, the network
becomes more valuable as the number of users on both sides increases. Breakup
remedies that interfere with that will not only make users worse off, but will also
be unstable because they are not equilibrium solutions.
Other types of interoperability—although that term may be a misnomer—
are also worth trying out. Full interoperability is “dynamic” in the sense that all
covered firms participate in ongoing changes, which occur more or less
simultaneously across all platforms. “Static” interoperability can also be
effective at promoting competition. One example is data portability. Facebook
limits users’ ability to switch away by making customer data nonportable.
Overall, Facebook users face low switching costs, and there are few limits on
their ability to switch to an additional or alternative networking site. As a user’s
history of photos, videos, and other communications becomes larger and more
valuable to that user, the cost of switching becomes higher. In his January 2022
decision sustaining the FTC’s complaint, Judge Boasberg described this as a
barrier to entry resulting from high switching costs—correctly so.38 A form of
35. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 222.
36. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.); see also 47 U.S.C. § 251(c).
37. See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulation
of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1398–99 (1999).
38. FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590-JEB, 2022 WL 103308, at *9 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“[T]he FTC advance[d] a modern variation on that wellestablished barrier to entry. It alleges that because a core purpose of personal social networking is to connect
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relief worth considering is a requirement that data be stored in a commonly
addressable and portable format that is controlled by the customer and
transferable at will. This is not the same thing as full interoperability, which
would mean that a customer’s changes on one platform would be automatically
synched to appear on other platforms as well. Whatever the precise solution,
fashioning it should begin with the premise that customers are the owners of
their personal data.
An alternative with promise but no track record outside of voluntary
arrangements is the reorganization of management rather than the firm
itself. That is, if you cannot make the firm’s assets structurally more
competitive, perhaps you can make its management more competitive. 39 For
example, suppose Amazon was reorganized under a board consisting of several
competing Amazon market participants with separate businesses of their own.
This board would have oversight over merchant selection and sales policies.
Plenty of precedent exists for treating the decisions of corporations run by
directors with independent businesses as agreements among directors’ separate
businesses, rather than as the unilateral actions of the parent firm. Important
Supreme Court decisions involving the Chicago Board of Trade, 40 the
Associated Press,41 and the NFL42 involved such structures. The Supreme Court
had no difficulty treating their conduct as agreements among their members
rather than unilateral conduct. Similar reasoning has been applied to hospital
staff privileges boards 43 and real estate associations whose members are active
brokers. 44 When the individual members collude with one another—even if
stockholders in a common enterprise—section 1 of the Sherman Act can be
brought to bear.
The significance is that collaborative conduct is treated under a much more
aggressive standard than is unilateral conduct. The concerns shift toward
agreements that reduce output and raise prices, rather than the strict standards
that apply to monopolizing conduct. For example, unilateral refusals to deal are
almost never unlawful under the antitrust laws, while concerted refusals can be.
Purely vertical restrictions, such as most-favored-nation clauses requiring
suppliers to discriminate against competitors, are subject to the rule of reason.
However, if these restrictions are horizontal because they are imposed by
agreement among a group of competitors, they can be unlawful per se. Even
and engage with personal connections, it is very difficult for a new entrant to displace an established personal
social network in which users’ friends and family already participate. In other words, why would new users go
to a social space that does not include their important contacts?”).
39. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, supra note 28, at 2021–32.
40. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918) (describing the agreement among shareholders
of an Illinois corporation).
41. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1945) (same, New York corporation).
42. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 189–96 (2010) (treating individual teams controlling NFL IPlicensing subsidiary as conspiring actors).
43. E.g., Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1993).
44. E.g., Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1144–47 (9th Cir. 2003).

August 2022

SELLING ANTITRUST

1633

under the rule of reason, however, the market power requirements under existing
law are lower. Under such a structure, these practices would be much easier to
reach, although they would still require a showing of competitive harm.45
D. SELF-PREFERENCING
Finally, a fourth position lies in the remedies contained in legislative
proposals pending in Congress under the name “self-preferencing.”46 This term
refers to situations where a platform provides its own goods or services as well
as the goods or services of others, and then somehow discriminates against the
third parties. The legislation clearly targets Amazon, but it also has relevance
for any covered platform that offers marketplaces for both its own services and
those of others, or who engage with a range of suppliers or advertisers.
The idea is a complete misfire to the extent that it ignores that consumer
switching is usually more costly in traditional brick-and-mortar stores. For
example, a customer in a physical Wal-Mart store who is unhappy with Wal
Mart’s preferencing of an in-house product over a rival brand’s product can
switch by driving to a different store. By contrast, a customer unhappy with
Amazon’s product selection can find alternatives with a mouse click. The
damage done by these provisions would be limited if they contained a market
power requirement, but as of this writing they appear not to. Rather, they are
explicitly directed at platforms of a certain gross size. For example, Amazon is
covered even though it has non-dominant market shares in most products that it
sells, save a few items such as eBooks.47
As currently formulated, the pending self-preferencing legislation is an
affront to both antitrust policy and intelligent regulatory policy. Indeed, it
displays all the signs of special interest capture disguised as an antitrust law.
Covered firms are chosen in a way designed to handicap a small number of
digital firms for the benefits of smaller firms or those that are dedicated to older
technologies.
A related concern is based on accusations that Amazon and perhaps other
firms collect data on goods that it sells for third parties and then takes advantage
of this data to engineer copies of these goods, typically selling them at a lower
price.
About the worst solution for these problems is a structural separation rule.
That would deprive customers of the benefits of intraplatform competition,
45. The proposal is developed more fully in Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, supra note 28,
at 2021–31.
46. See American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2021–2022); see also Taylor
Hatmaker, The First Big Tech Antitrust Bill Lumbers Toward Reality, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 20, 2022, 3:14 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2022/01/20/tech-antitrust-self-preferencing-bill-american-innovation-and-choice
online-act/.
47. See Sandy Smith, 2021 Top 100 Retailers, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N (July 6, 2021),
https://nrf.com/blog/2021-top-100-retailers (indicating that Amazon holds less than ten percent of the retail
market share even as it ranks second in a list of ten largest retailers in 2021).
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which is substantial on platforms such as Amazon, but also on others such as
eBay. Amazon presents a rather different problem from the chain stores that
provoked Louis Brandeis’s anger in the 1920s and 1930s.48 A big chain such as
A&P largely sold its own goods in competition with smaller firms, who suffered
greatly from the increased competition. By contrast, Amazon’s relationship with
third-party sellers is as both competitor and broker, and it is important to
segregate those roles.
Amazon’s sale of its own goods, through its house brands like
AmazonBasics, affects rivals in a variety of ways. First, there is one set of small
firms who choose not to sell on Amazon at all. They certainly face more
competition, but they are not the target of these bills because they are already
off the platform. Second are small firms that sell on Amazon and that may be
vulnerable if Amazon manipulates its displays or terms, or reverse engineers its
products. Third are large firms that have premium brands of their own. The
largest dollar volume of AmazonBasics sales comes from selling products also
sold by other large firms. These include goods like alkaline batteries, which
Amazon sells in competition with brands such as Duracell, Eveready, or
Energizer. Duracell is owned by Berkshire Hathaway, one of the largest firms in
the country, but the other name brands are also large firms. A second large
category is consumable office supplies, where Amazon’s principal competitor is
3M, another very large firm. A third is small electronic appliances such as
toasters, where Amazon competes with Black & Decker, the largest maker of
small appliances in the United States, and Cuisinart. A fourth is electronics
cables, sold in competition with Anker and Belkin. For all of these, the impact
of Amazon’s own product presence is clear: consumers have an additional
choice, and the premium brand must cut its price or lose sales. The only entity
that will benefit if Amazon is forbidden from selling AmazonBasics and
Duracell batteries on the same website is Berkshire Hathaway.
This hardly means that antitrust is toothless. It just needs to search more
carefully for competitive harm. One such harm is the platform-most-favored
clause, which requires sellers to sell to others only at higher prices. Another is
exclusive dealing, and there may be others that can be challenged under section 1
of the Sherman Act.
The final problem here is reverse engineering and knockoffs. The literature
in this area is heavily anecdotal and focuses on relatively few instances,49 but
clearly some exist. The problem raises several questions. First, is Amazon using
information supplied by these third-party sellers that is not generally available?
For example, anyone can purchase a product from Amazon and examine it or
read Amazon’s own posted customer reviews in order to create a knockoff.
48. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933).
49. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. L. OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS (2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
competition_in_digital_markets.pdf?utm_campaign=4493-519.
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By contrast, sales figures may not be readily available. The current version
of the Innovation and Choice Online Act 50 limits coverage to situations where
platforms use nonpublic data to inform their reverse engineering.51 Whether that
describes a significant set of instances is doubtful.
Second, what about the role of intellectual property laws? If the products
that Amazon is copying are protected by utility or design patents, copyrights, or
trademarks, Amazon is guilty of infringement. If not, then the general policy of
American law is to permit, or even encourage, copying things that are in the
public domain. Witness, for example, the considerable enthusiasm we show for
the ability to copy patented pharmaceutical drugs when their patents expire.
Once again, this is not to say that Amazon is not doing anything
anticompetitive, but rather that this issue needs to be pursued more
dispassionately, very likely with more precision in individual instances, and with
more factfinding in order to determine which conduct is harmful and which is
not.
CONCLUSION
One important feature of the digital economy is its lopsided contribution to
the broader economy, with a growth rate as much as four times greater than that
of the economy overall.52 This is true mainly because that part of the economy
has provided both businesses and consumers with products and technologies that
they value. It takes a special arrogance to deny this migration and substitute it
for some version of a past that no longer exists.

50. American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2021–2022).
51. Id. § 2(b)(3).
52. KEVIN BAREFOOT, DAVE CURTIS, WILLIAM JOLLIFF, JESSICA R. NICHOLSON & ROBERT OMOHUNDRO,
DEFINING AND MEASURING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS 2 (2018), https://judiciary
.house.gov/uploadedfiles/competition_in_digital_markets.pdf?utm_campaign=4493-519 (estimating GDP
growth in digital economy during 2006–2016 at 5.6% against a general economic growth rate of 1.5%).
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